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The past several decades witnessed an explosion of international
interest in the legal treatment of intellectual property and digital in-
formation. Motivated largely by undeniable changes in the global
economy and led politically by the United States, these intangibles
and the rights associated with them became not only a focus of global
trade, but a central point of debate in law harmonization worldwide.
The recently completed WTO agreement for the first time spells out
trade-related obligations concerning intellectual property rights, an
explicit recognition of the importance of this type of material in mod-
em world trade.
The attention centered on intangible property highlights the com-
mercial importance of this type of property. In addition, it brings to
the forefront of international commerce the various types of transac-
tions within which intangible property and the rights related to that
property are conveyed. Unlike goods, most transactions involving in-
tangibles occur under a license contract, rather than a sale. The law
and practice of license contracts, therefore, play a major role in mod-
em commerce. The fact that this area of law remains undeveloped
nationally and internationally reflects a corresponding need for sys-
tematic consideration about the appropriate contours of a contract
law structure.
The evolution of the global information infrastructure (GII) ac-
centuates the importance of contract as well as intellectual property
law issues. It heightens the need to harmonize how problems are ad-
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dressed on an international level. It does so, of course, because the
property traded (information in digital form) and the messages ex-
changed across the networks move rapidly across national lines and, in
a single transaction, may affect many countries in the space of
seconds. Developing a concept of contract law for this environment
that has stability in international venues is essential to the develop-
ment of the GIl. In the absence of stable, predictable rules governing
contract relationships as well as intellectual property rights, the vision
of a flourishing and commercially vibrant global information system
will be seriously impeded, if not blocked.
This article explores some of the issues in international licensing
and, particularly, in the evolution of information-based contracts cen-
tered on the GIl. Part 1 describes the basics of intellectual property
law. Along with communications law, privacy rules and criminal law
theories, intellectual property concepts provide a baseline of what
rights exist to be licensed or otherwise transferred on the GIl. What
we find, not surprisingly, is a complex web consisting of not only simi-
larities, but also of conflicting details and conflicting general themes
across the countries of the world. This is a standard international law
observation, but it becomes accentuated in modern information prac-
tice in the GII because the subject matter and methodology of the
transactions in this electronic milieu are more truly international and
internationally bound than in traditional systems of ordering, shipping
and receiving hard goods from other countries.
Part 2 provides an overview of licensing law. Under current con-
tract law regimes, much of the basic contract principles of licensing
consist of general law not tailored to the particulars of licensing prac-
tice and, in many cases, not readily identifiable in the applicable na-
tional law regime. In this respect, I point out not only the uncertainty
of the law today, but also the existence of a project in the U.S. to
develop uniform and coherent rules for intangibles licensing.
Part 3 describes several issues of contract law in the electronic
world of licensing of electronic rights and digital product. Here we
have a special convergence of contracts, contract performance and im-
mediate international accessibility. At essentially all levels of the
analysis, the material handled is in purely electronic transactions
(computer to computer creation and performance), and the underly-
ing principles of contract law are unknown or obscure. Such circum-
stances suffice for transactions in intermittent or casual relationships,
but they create potentially huge problems in a truly commercial global
marketplace. The problems need to be addressed at an international
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as well as a local level using principles of contract and property that fit
the modem digital world of the GII.
PART 1
PROPERTY RIGHTS BASE
The GII consists of a network of computer networks and sepa-
rately owned computers connected by virtue of agreements, coopera-
tive ventures, transmissions or access capability and the like.'
Transmission of information and messages across this network entails
passing packets of data from one computer to another through an en-
vironment that enables the message and data, or the request for data,
to reach a destination bounded not by physical limits, but by elec-
tronic and cyber connections. Unlike airline or physical routes, how-
ever, the paths are generally not subject to regulation by external
forces; the path taken may vary widely even for messages sent to and
from similar locations. In international transmissions, a packet of
electronic data may pass through several countries en route to a
destination.
Because of this, all GII transactions potentially engage the under-
lying intellectual property, human rights and contract laws of multiple
countries. The belief that a global economy exists in this setting
changes from image to undeniable reality. In discussing the Gil we
move from questions about how goods move from state to state to
questions about what are the international dimensions of digitized in-
formation products shunted from country to country with the push of
a button not only by major corporations, but by individuals with ac-
cess to a simple, readily obtainable computer.2
Much of the value and opportunity related to property moving
along this network infrastructure will be shaped by communications
law, criminal law, privacy, and related concerns.' In addition, some
(perhaps a major share) of the basic property rights involved will be
defined by intellectual property law on national and international
basis.
1 See generally ALBERT GORE, GLOBAL INFORMATION STRucTuRE: AGENDA FOR COOPER-
ATION (1995).
2 Of course, many messages on the GII will relate ultimately to a purchase and sale of goods
with the network serving as a form of telecommunications. See generally Electronic Messaging
Task Force, The Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange: A Report and Model Trading
Partner Agreement, 45 Bus. LAW 1645 (1990).
3 See RAYMOND T. NIMMER & PATRICIA A. KRAuTHAus, 55 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 103
(1992); Edmund Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 683 (1980).
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While this article cannot cover the world of intellectual property
regimes, it is important to understand the nature and the degree of
conflict and uncertainty that subsists in the current global information
network in order to understand the relationship between this context
and the advent of international information licensing law regimes.
Although patent, trade secret and similar intellectual property re-
gimes play important roles, much of the rights picture and the interna-
tional complexity involved can be grasped by focusing simply on
copyright law.
Copyright systems are territorial in nature; they cover acts and
rights only within the country of their origin.4 Within each country,
fundamental differences in approach and application are likely to be
found in both details and in general principles. As a general point for
discussion, there are three underlying themes that define general dif-
ferences among various countries.
The first is utilitarian.5 In the United States and other anglo-
american or common law tradition countries, copyright rights are
viewed as part of an intellectual property "bargain." As part of this
bargain, law provides economic and control incentives for authors
with the goal of enhancing the overall production of works of inven-
tion and authorship,6 while leaving unprotected and available for free
public use important aspects of works, such as the idea content, the
factual references, and processes described in a work.7 This public
benefit analysis leads away from a focus on the unique attributes of a
person and toward a focus on levels of originality or inventiveness
adequate to justify protection.
The second, competing approach arises in civil law countries and
views copyright as deriving more from the natural or personal rights
of the individual as an author than from a social goal of promoting
scientific or creative productivity.' As a matter of practice, the differ-
ences between this approach and the common law approach, at least
with respect to economic rights, have tended to be eliminated by in-
ternational convergence. Yet, the civil law approach creates an em-
phasis on many important individual rights which, in some cases,
cannot be effectively transferred. These involve the so-called "moral
rights" of an author, such as an author's right to prevent harmful mod-
4 See DAVID NiMmER & MELVILLE NimmEr, NimmER ON CoPYRIG-rr § 17.02 (1983).
5 See id.
6 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 109 (1989).
7 See Feist Publ., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
8 See generally S. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGTrr AND NEIGHBORNG RIGHTs (2d
ed 1989); NIMMER & NimmER, supra note 4.
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ification of the work ("integrity") and the right to attribution for in-
volvement in the work ("paternity"). 9
A third category refers broadly to countries who have no effec-
tive copyright-related traditions. As a social matter, copying of mate-
rial prepared by another does not represent wrongful conduct.
During years of active political effort, many countries who fit this cat-
egory, either socially or pragmatically, have been forced into positions
more in line with the two other dominant standards, at least in refer-
ence to formal law development.'0
The degree of divergence in detail among these approaches and
within the countries that fit a particular model defines a significant
variable in the GIl. For example, in the United States, particular facts
cannot be protected against duplication under copyright law no matter
how difficult the effort in finding and compiling the facts." This cre-
ates a significant obstacle for the development and commercial ex-
ploitation of electronic databases which, in the United States, may be
subject to correction through the application of communications, pri-
vacy and similar law.' 2 In the European Union (EU), however, a di-
rective on database law would create a sui generis right to prevent
wrongful extraction of data not otherwise protected by copyright
law. 3 The significance of the difference for the GII and licensing in
that environment is large. In the U.S., factual material can be taken
from the original compiler if access to the electronic database does not
violate law. In the EU, on the other hand, factual materials are pro-
tected if the owner of the database can show substantial investment in
the creation of the work.
9 These rights are provided for in the Berne Convention as well as in the respective national
laws of the affected countries. BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LrrERACY AND
ARTISTIC WORKS (1886).
10 See generally RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 5.08-5.10
(1992).
11 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 310 (1991); Bellsouth Advertis-
ing & Publishing Co. v. Donnelly Info. Publishing Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993) (Yellow
pages organization not copyrightable; even though numerous categories used, they were all obvi-
ous or ordinary).
12 See generally Raymond T. Nimmer and Patricia A. Krauthaus, Information as a Commod-
ity: New Imperatives of Commercial Law, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (1992); Raymond T.
Nimmer and Patricia A. Krauthaus, Copyright on the Information Superhighway: Requiem for a
Middleweight, 6 STrAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 25 (1994).
13 See Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases,
COM(93) 464 final - SYN 393 OJ93/C 308/01. For a discussion of this Directive, see Christo-
pher Millard, Comments on the Proposed EC Database Directive, 6 WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REPORT (1992).
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National divergence on these issues is accentuated by the crea-
tion, over the years, of various copyright-related rights that may, or
may not, fall within the copyright law of a particular country or be
governed by international copyright conventions. These are neighbor-
ing rights. The most significant in reference to the GII involves rights
in sound recordings which, when first encountered in law, fit none of
the existing copyright regimes. 14 In the United States, rights in sound
recordings exist under copyright law. However, that approach does
not occur throughout the world. The divergence affects in what way a
commercial entity on the GII can rely on enforcing rights in sound
recordings (or ignoring those rights) in countries around the world.
Several treaty regimes link general traditions and the specific var-
iations into a semblance of an international web. Historically, the
most important in international copyright flow from the variations of
the Berne Convention on Copyright. 15 Administered by the World In-
tellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a potentially functional web
of international principles stems from a number of treaties related to
the international copyright and neighboring rights. The conventions
and, most specifically, the Berne Convention, achieved relatively wide
acceptance in the international community. However, that acceptance
is not universal. For example, the United States first joined Berne in
1989 (currently over 110 countries are signatories).' 6
The Berne Convention does not generally regulate the substan-
tive content of international copyright. It mandates only minimum
levels of protection. Otherwise, the main contribution that Berne
makes is to establish a principle of so-called "national treatment.'
17
The premise of national treatment lies in the commitment that a for-
eign national receives the same copyright protection in a particular
country as is available to nationals of that country.
A contrasting approach to international rights law, "reciprocity,"
sets out the premise that nationals of one country receive the benefits
14 See, eg., Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against the
Unauthorized Reproduction of their Phonograms, 25 U.S.T 309 (1971).
15 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of Sept. 9, 1886, com-
pleted at Paris on May 4,1896, revised at Berlin on Nov. 13,1908, completed at Berne on March
20,1914, revised at Rome on June 2,1928, at Brussels on June 26,1948, at Stockholm on July 14,
1967, and at Paris on July 24, 1971. The Berne Convention entered into force in the United
States on March 1, 1989. See Berne Convention, supra note 9.
16 A parallel copyright convention, adopted primarily to deal with the fact that the United
States and some other countries required formalities to establish a copyright, is the Universal
Copyright Convention with membership of over ninety countries. Universal Copyright Conven-
tion, 25 UST 1341 (1971).
17 See supra note 9, at 5(1) & 5(2).
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of the other country's law only if their national origin creates similar
rights or obligations in its own law. While the Berne Convention
adopts an aggressive national treatment position, several recent enact-
ments or proposals in the United States and in the EU adopt a reci-
procity framework, presumably as a wedge to encourage other
countries to follow the policy decisions reached in the country adopt-
ing the idea of reciprocity.'"
A second major regime for international intellectual property law
harmonization stems from the development of intellectual property
principles under the multinational trade agreement that resulted in
the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the culmina-
tion of the negotiations relating to the General Agreement on Tariff
and Trade. 19 The intellectual property principles adopted as part of
this agreement create a number of obligations on the trading partners
who become part of the treaty. These obligations include: to protect
computer software under copyright law; to protect trade secret and
sound recording owner's rights; and, with some exceptions, to develop
a national treatment principle consistent with the Berne Convention.
This combination of national variation and limited international
harmonization affects the treatment of digital property transfers im-
plemented through the GII in various ways. If one conceives of the
GII as merely a way of augmenting the transfer of goods across na-
tional boundaries, the difference between telex, telephone and com-
puter has marginal relevance. 20  There are important issues of
ensuring that international treatment of the enforceability of elec-
tronic messages (offers and acceptance) reflect reasonable and consis-
tent principles. However, the fundamental ability to close commercial
deals electronically represents only a small step away from what oc-
curred before the GIl.
The more basic change and challenge that the computer networks
create involves the handling of information as the direct subject of
commerce and trade. The ability to transmit information assets from
company to company and company to customer through the network
18 See, e.g., Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases,
COM(93) 464 final - SYN 393 OJ93/C 308/01. The reciprocity approach was previously used by
the United States with reference to intellectual property protection of semiconductor mask
works. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-912 (1995).
19 See O-icE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TRADE-RELATED AsPECrs OF INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY, FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF THE
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATION (1993).
20 But see UNITED NATIONS COMUSSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, DRAFT MODEL
LAW ON EDI (1995) (proposing various statutory provisions to clarify the effectiveness of elec-
tronic messages and deal with other aspects of international EDI deals).
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and the GII, presents an entirely new and different problem for inter-
national and national law. Information assets differ in basic content
and structure from assets definable by a particular item located in a
particular place.2' The information asset can be transferred and simul-
taneously retained.22 It also can be duplicated virtually without
limitation.
Equally important, digital information assets are subject to prop-
erty law rules that differ substantially from the tangible property law
rules that affect when, or whether, one company can transfer a prod-
uct (tangible) to another company. While they both deal with "prop-
erty," the law of ownership of goods differs fundamentally from the
intellectual property laws of "ownership" of information.23 On an in-
ternational scale, the difference affects the fundamental question of
whether any property right exists and whether it can be transferred.
This is largely uncharted territory for legal analysis. Consider, for ex-
ample, a packet of data obtained by a Boston company from a Ger-
man database through a remote access which passes through a
Mexican computer. If the data is purely factual materials and the EU
Directive had been implemented, the German company "owned" a
right to prevent or control extraction of the material from its
database. On the other hand, in the United States, a principle of na-
tional treatment would indicate that no rights exist in a purely factual
database. The circumstances in Mexico might fit either model or a
third one. Has an infringement occurred? Under which set of laws
will it be litigated?
Remember that in electronic worlds, the entire transaction, ac-
cess and duplication (Canada and Boston) of the data, occurs within
moments. Conceivably, given the territorial character of intellectual
property laws, the answer is that the law of all three countries applies
separately and defines separate infringing or non-infringing acts. If
that answer is correct in the GII, vendors and users of the digital in-
formation assets transferred within that system will be immediately
and recurrently subject to multiple, perhaps inconsistent legal regimes
21 See Raymond T. Nimmer and Patricia A. Krauthaus, Information as a Commodity: New
Imperatives of Commercial Law, 55 LAW & CoNTrmP. PROBS. 103 (1992); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARv. J. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 108 (1990); Edmund Kitch,
The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683 (1980).
22 Information is often described in economic theory as a form of public goods because of
these attributes. See Otto Davis and Andrew Whinston, On the Distinction Between Public and
Private Goods, 57 AM EC N. REV. 360 (1967).
23 See Raymond T. Nimmer and Patricia A. Krauthaus, Information as Property: Databases
and Commercial Property, 1 OxFoRD J.L. & IN~o. TEcH. 1 (1993).
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in each transaction they undertake. The potential for blockage of the
GII as a commercial venue is apparent.
That potential becomes even more explicit when we add to the
intellectual property mix the various political, free speech, privacy,
and other social concerns that shape the law. These combine to create
laws related to handling information which may differ from how a
country's norms shape the simple question of how one person can sell
a television from Japan to a buyer in Paris. 4 Information considered
obscene, irreverent or politically unacceptable in one country may
reach that country from a jurisdiction in which entirely different judg-
ments would be made about the content of the information. To recon-
cile the potential liability in such cases is no less difficult than to apply




The paradigmatic transaction in intellectual property and digital
information practice entails a license, rather than a sale. A license
transfers rights to employ the underlying intangibles: rights or infor-
mation assets. In general terms, a "license" resembles a lease of tangi-
ble property, but the general analogy holds only superficially. While
the capability to use the underlying intangible property may be cre-
ated through a transfer of some tangible property such as a tape, a
diskette or a film, the transaction focuses on the permission granted in
the contract with respect to what rights the licensor holds in the un-
derlying information or intellectual property.25 A "license" is an
"agreement for a transfer of conditional or limited rights in [informa-
tion or intellectual property]." 26
A license may be "exclusive" or "nonexclusive," with the latter
being the most common commercial transaction.27 A grant of a nonex-
clusive license grants the licensee no property rights in the underlying
24 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757
(1995); Fred H. Cate, The First Amendment and the National Information Infrastructure, 30
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1 (1995).
25 See, e.g., ANT-ONY W. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 538 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter DELLER].
26 Proposed Article 2B: Licenses, Proposed U.C.C. § 2B-102(28) (1995) [hereinafter Article
2B Proposal].
27 NIMMER, supra note 10, 7.02.
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intangibles. 8 The transaction is in the nature of a permission to use
information. The contract grant relates to activities such as a right to
use, copy, modify, display, disclose, perform, access or to any of a
number of other actions associated with proprietary or control rights
in intangibles.
In a license, the rights granted are conditional or limited, gener-
ally less than the licensor's entire rights or interests in the underlying
intangibles. The manner in which the grant is viewed, however, varies
somewhat depending on the type of intellectual property or informa-
tion asset involved.
Under patent law, a license constitutes, in effect, an agreement
not to sue the licensee for using patented technology.2 9 The patent
law of most countries does not grant the patent holder an affirmative
right to use its patented technology, only the right to prevent others
from doing so. This underlying intellectual property concept affects
the understanding of the contractual relationship. At least under U.S.
law, a patent license does not typically contain an implied representa-
tion that the technology can be used without infringing technology
rights held by other parties.
A copyright license, on the other hand, might be viewed as a
more affirmative grant, enabling the licensee to utilize by copying or
other action, the work of authorship to which the copyright extends."0
Copyright law focuses on the creation of "exclusive" rights. This ordi-
narily entails a right to use and otherwise exercise what property was
granted. The existence of blocking patents or technology that might
be infringed by use does not typically arise in copyright law. How-
ever, it may become increasingly common in computer software. Ar-
guably, there is an affirmative covenant here that the licensed work
does not in itself infringe another work of authorship.
A trade secret license entails an additional variation because the
license actually involves a limited disclosure of otherwise secret or
confidential information.31 As in the realm of patents, there are no
implicit representations about the licensee's right to use the informa-
tion without infringing other technology rights, but the transaction
does not actually involve a mere waiver of the right to sue the licensee
for use of otherwise exclusive rights. The license entails, rather, a con-
28 17 USC § 101 (1995). See also Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.
1984); In re Alitech Plastics, Inc., 71 B.R. 686 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1987).
29 See generally DELLER, supra note 25.
30 See NmmER & NImmER, supra note 4, § 10.13A.
31 See generally ROGER MILGRim, TRADE SEcRETs § 12.13.
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ditional disclosure and compliance with the conditions or limits repre-
sents the primary obligation of the licensee.
A fourth form of license deals with intellectual property in a less
direct way. This license form grants access to an information asset,
typically an electronic or digital information asset.3 2 Licenses of this
type deal less with an underpinning of intellectual property law and
focus instead on the licensee's right to make use of an asset which may
or may not be created under any intellectual property law regime. In-
deed, for these assets, the critical value that is being traded may be
safeguarded under communications law, criminal law or any of a vari-
ety of other regimes that give the "owner" a right to control access to
her property. This access license is often an affirmative grant, rather
than a negative proposition.
Despite the differences, two central features exist in all of these
information license transactions. First, the licensee does not acquire
ownership or absolute control over the information asset involved.
Ownership of the intangible asset remains in the licensor. For exam-
ple, when a party in Germany accesses a commercial database in the
United States, the implied or explicit contract between the parties al-
lows the German customer access to the digital information, and if
applicable, allows the customer to make a copy of some part of the
asset in Germany. The data proprietor in the United States does not
relinquish the asset. Second, after the copy is made, the U.S. owner
retains the database as it previously existed with no diminishment.
This last point constitutes the second central characteristic of licensing
as contrasted to other forms of transaction. In dealing with in-
tangibles, the vendor can and typically does have its cake and eat it
too. The asset does not diminish or deplete because a licensed trans-
fer occurred.
Typical licenses vary depending on the underlying intellectual
property or digital information. They also vary in terms of the collat-
eral actions that the licensor takes under the agreement. In a "pure"
license, especially in context of patent licensing, executing a naked
grant of a right or privilege (permission) is often the only action taken
in the transfer. Details about the patent are available on public rec-
ord. In some cases, the transferee does not truly desire to use the
patented invention, but merely wants to be free from possible claims
of infringement. In other more "commercial" licenses, the licensor is
32 The draft of the proposed U.C.C. Article 2B defines this as a "access contract," defined as
a contract that transfers a right to have access to an intangible, data system, or other facility
under the control of the licensor. Article 2B Proposal, supra note 26.
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obligated to take steps that enable the transferee to exercise the trans-
ferred rights.3 This portion of the transaction entails many different
possibilities such as: providing staff to communicate information to
the transferee; delivering a diskette that contains a copy of the
software in which fights are conveyed; providing access codes for a
remote database; delivering specifications and designs; electronically
transferring a manuscript or written description; etc.
What Law Applies
Whether they pertain to software, databases, digital information
or any other type of intangibles, license agreements are commercially
important contracts. The licensing paradigm states the appropriate
model under which to develop concepts of transactional law applica-
ble to intangible property displayed on or accessible through the GIl.
Indeed, it is difficult to visualize what other model might apply be-
cause the intangible assets scattered across the GII are so unlike
goods and often unrelated to any personal services.
What law currently applies to a license contract and what sub-
stantive rules shape the terms of the agreement? Answering this
question within the United States presents immense problems. An-
swering the question across the GII verges on impossibility.
This article concerns contract law and practice, but influences
from many other legal venues affect contract terms. Intellectual prop-
erty law directly affects substantive terms by defining what rights exist
that can be made the subject of the agreement and, in some cases,
stating limits on what transactional effects can be achieved. The inter-
national variance is especially broad, a fact that greatly influences the
fluidity of the Gil as a forum of international commerce;' it produced
the international accord represented in the agreement on trade-re-
lated aspects of intellectual property in the recently concluded GATT
treaty.35 In the United States, for example, some cases hold that li-
cense terms that extend a licensor's control of the licensee beyond the
underlying intellectual property right violate intellectual property pol-
33 See discussion in Burkert v. Petrol Plus of Naugatuck, 216 Conn. 65, 579 A.2d 26 (1990).
34 See Charles J. Meyer, National and International Copyright Liability for Electronic System
Operators, 2 GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIEs 497 (1995).
35 GATT (Uruguay Round), Agreement of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (1995).
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icy.36 In a number of European countries, purported transfers of so-
called moral rights are invalid, but waivers can be obtained.37
Competition or antitrust laws also directly affect contract law.
U.S. antitrust law affects permissible license provisions in some re-
spects. 38 Additionally, especially in reference to digital information
products, potentially strong influences are likely from the various con-
stitutional and privacy law spheres that roughly comprise individual
rights law. For example, the European Union recently approved a di-
rective on data protection rules.39 The Directive calls for laws restrict-
ing and regulating the use and the transfer across national borders of
personal information about individuals without meeting various con-
sent obligations. In the United States, both privacy law and constitu-
tional considerations limit the liability of information providers who
commit errors. In sum, the applicability of these doctrines to the digi-
tal information industry remains uncertain.4 °
Rather than being an unregulated community, the GII is subject
to immense and often intrusive regulation throughout the world.41
The array of issues presented is, in itself, an argument for a contract-
based environment in which at least the basics of the contractual
framework arising on GII can be outlined and handled by agreement
of the parties.42 Yet, in the United States, it is difficult to identify what
area of contract law applies to a license. In many respects, the avail-
able alternatives do not provide a commercially sound or readily dis-
cernable basis for contracting practice.
Four or five possible sources of contract doctrine exist in the
United States which might govern licenses. These include sales of
36 See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (patent misuse); Lasercomb
America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990) (copyright misuse).
37 See Ann Moebes, Copyright Protection for Audiovisual Works in the European Commu-
nity, 15 HASTINGS CoMM/EN'r. L.J. 399 (1993); Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions
and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 347
(1993).
38 See, eg., Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984).
39 Amended Proposal for a Directive on Data Protection, COM(94) 128 final - COD 288
(June 13, 1994).
40 See Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991) (publisher of book not
accountable for wrong information).
41 Christopher Millard and Robert Carolina, Commercial Transactions on the Global Infor-
mation Infrastructure: A European Perspective, 269 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFORMATION
TECHN. LAW. 272 (1996).
42 Several commentators have suggested that governance issues in the internet or the GII
should be viewed from a contract-based model overall. See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Dispute Reso-
lution in Electronic Network Communities, 38 VILL L. REv. 349 (1993); David R. Johnson and
Kevin A. Marks, Mapping Electronic Data Communications onto Existing Legal Metaphors:
Should we Let our Conscience (and our Contracts) be our Guide?, 38 ViLL L. REv. 487 (1993).
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goods law under UCC Article 2, personal property leasing law under
Article 2A of the UCC, and the common law of contracts. However,
within the common law different traditions and doctrines arise with
respect to services contracts and contracts involving information as-
sets. Of these, on first blush, the least likely to apply would be UCC
Article 2. The statute focuses on tangibles (rather than information)
and on transactions that divest the vendor of title to the asset, placing
the asset into the ownership and control of the buyer. Yet, Article 2
has a profound effect on licensing law if only because many courts in
the United States have held that the sale of goods statute applies to
licenses of computer software. 43 Article 2A deals with personal prop-
erty leases. The conditional delivery model in such transactions ap-
pears more similar to licensing. Although the statute invites
expansive application,44 only one court has suggested that a license
could be treated as a lease.45 Indeed, many of the rules in Article 2
reflect the focus on the tangible, rather than intangible, property.
Internationally, there is a similar, albeit more complex and uncer-
tain picture. Obviously, national contract laws differ and make many
subclassification decisions as to applicable contract law principles. On
a global basis, a widely adopted, but infrequently used, international
convention has been promulgated dealing with the sale of goods.46 Of
potentially broader application, UNIDROIT promulgated a statement
43 Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, .939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991); Advent
Systems Ltd v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991); Systems Design & Management Infor-
mation, Inc. v. Kansas City Post Office Employees Credit Union, 14 Kan. App.2d 266, 788 P.2d
878 (1990); Herbert Friedman & Assoc., Inc. v. Lifetime Doors, Inc., 1989 US Dist. LEXIS 15239
(ND Ill. 1990); RRX Industries, Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985); Triangle
Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat'l Cash
Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980); Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F.
Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Neilson Business Equipment Center, Inc. v. Italo Monteleone, M.D.,
524 A.2d 1172 (Del. 1987); 'The Drier Co. v. Unitronix Corp., 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 1728 (NJ
Super. App. Div. 1987); Austin's of Monroe, Inc. v. Brown, 474 So.2d 1383 (La. Ct. App. 1985);
Schroders, Inc. v. Hogan Sys., Inc., 137 Misc.2d 738, 522 N.Y.S.2d 404 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987);
Photo Copy, Inc. v. Software, Inc., 510 So.2d 1337 (La Ct. App. 1987); Systems Design & Man-
agement Information, Inc. v. Kansas City Post Office Employees Credit Union, 14 Kan App.2d
266, 788 P.2d 878 (1990); Communications Groups, Inc. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 136
Misc.2d 80, 527 N.Y.S.2d 341 (NY Civ. Ct. 1988); USM Corp. v. Arthur Little Sys., Inc., 28 Mass.
App. 108, 546 N.E.2d 888 (1989); Hospital Computer Sys., Inc. v. Staten Island Hosp., 788 F.
Supp. 1351 (D.NJ. 1992); In re Amica, 135 Bankr. 534 (B.R. ND I11. 1992); Camara v. Hill, 596
A.2d 349 (Vermont 1991).
44 U.C.C. § 2A-102, Comment. ("A court may apply this Article by analogy to any transac-
tion, regardless of form, that creates a lease of personal property other than goods .... ).
45 See Communications Groups, Inc. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 136 Misc. 2d 80, 527
N.Y.S.2d 341 (County CL 1988).
46 See generally Peter Winship, Changing Contract Practice in the Light of the United Nations
Sales Convention: A Guide for Practitioners, 29 Tim INr'L LAW. 525 (1995).
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of basic international commercial contract principles which is similar
to U.S. Restatements of Law.47 However, neither work addresses GII
licensing issues.
In part because of the importance of the subject matter and the
lack of clear contract law, a proposal by the United States would
bring license contract law into the UCC as Article 2B: Licenses.'
Commenting on this project, the recent Report of the Working Group
on Intellectual Property Rights (White Paper) of the U.S. Commerce
Department noted:
The challenge for commercial law, as for intellectual property law, is to
adapt to the reality of the NIl by providing clear guidance as to the
rights and responsibilities of those using the NII .... Historically, the
U.C.C. has been extremely successful in clarifying the law. However, as
technology advances, the way in which business is conducted places
strains upon the U.C.C.... therefore, the Working Group supports the
efforts presently underway to revise ... the U.C.C. to encompass licens-
ing of intellectual property.49
The harmonization issues here involve both dealing with inconsis-
tencies of result across different jurisdictions and clarifying what re-
sults obtain as a matter of basic principle. In respect to both issues,
the GII and its local twin, the NII (National Information Infrastruc-
ture), create an environment in which state borders, already being
made less and less relevant by trade and geopolitical considerations,
become even more marginal because of a technology capable of draw-
ing valuable property across the globe instantaneously.
PART 3
ELECTRONIC LICENSES ON THE GII
A global information system network entails true global behav-
ior. Transactions, property rights and regulations are, at least poten-
tially, all determinable on a multi-national basis in each transaction.
The movement of information and messages through this network not
only transcends national boundaries, but also makes them irrelevant
unless the law of a country forces that relevance back into the com-
mercial and economic mix. For example, I can transfer or sell data as
easily from Houston to London as from Houston to Dallas. If the law
of the particular destination or of any intermediate country permits, I
47 UNIDROIT, Principles of International Commercial Contracts (Rome, 1994).
48 Article 2B Proposal, supra note 26, at Preface.
49 Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, Intellectual Property and
the National Information Infrastructure 58-59 (Sept., 1995) (hereinafter White Paper).
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will build my business and personal behavior around exactly that
premise - I am in an immediate and efficient international market-
place even if I reside in Podunk, Idaho.
When discussing Gil licensing, it is helpful to distinguish among
possible contracting activities based on variations in two over-lapping
factors. The first deals with the subject matter of the contract, and the
second deals with its formation. On the first issue, electronic contracts
can deal either with material outside of the computer (e.g., goods) or
subject matter in a computer system (e.g., access to digital informa-
tion). The distinction is significant. A purely electronic transaction
can be contracted for and performed within the electronic systems; it
involves information, not goods. What law governs this transaction?
In cases involving transactions in goods in the United States, Article 2
of the UCC applies. In an international deal within the scope of the
U.N. Sales Convention, that transaction applies internationally unless
excluded by the agreement of the parties. In contrast, when we deal
with transactions that are purely electronic (created and performed
within the computer systems), the impact of the GII structure is dra-
matic. Dealing with purely electronic subject matter means transact-
ing with information (or services) rather than goods. Within the
United States, this shift yields a change of law from the UCC to gen-
eral common law, including the local variations it produces in refer-
ence to critical issues involving enforceability and warranty or other
concerns.
The second distinguishing dimension concerns the extent of direct
human involvement in particular deals. International contract law
theory reflects the assumption that a human being will initiate and
respond to the paper, message or other event that causes a contract to
occur. Dual involvement will be common on the GII. Equally or
more common, however, will be cases in which one side or both sides
of the digital transaction involve a computer operating on a program,
rather than immediate human control. The law must accommodate
such cases to reflect a modification of a humanistic assumption in
contracting.
We need in cyberspace a body of contract principles that cope
with the absence of human interaction in an electronic venue. This
will not be easy. Today, in many countries, a battery of legal princi-
ples flow from the assumption that at least one party engages in the
transaction through direct human involvement. Thus, a consumer
must consent to a particular clause. A licensee accepts or rejects an
offer. The parties intend a particular result. A warranty disclaimer is
Northwestern Journal of
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conspicuous to the buyer if it is in LARGE CAPS or otherwise made
NOTICEABLE to the other party.50 All of this presumes human interac-
tion, but the essential economies of the digital marketplace make re-
current and direct human involvement inefficient and likely to be
avoided if possible.
Choice of Law
It is impossible to discuss all of the contract issues that might
arise on the Gil. Instead, a brief look at two critical issues must suf-
fice. The first deals with choice of law: what country's contract law
regime applies to a cyberspace transaction?
Commercial parties may select a body of law applicable to their
contract. However, absent explicit agreement in the contract, in subse-
quent litigation a court or other decision-maker will determine what
law applies."' Generally, choices will be enforced if they do not con-
flict with the basic underlying policy of a forum state. In negotiated,
global commercial arrangements, usually the parties will determine
what law applies to the deal. This will also likely be true in cases
where a GII transaction is preceded by an agreement of the parties
enabling the use of and reliance on GII principles.52
The importance of the choice of law issue in GII transactions,
however, arises in two other settings. The first involves situations
where the material being received or transmitted engages an impor-
tant or fundamental social policy against transfer or receipt, and the
contract choice attempts to make that state's law inapplicable. This
could occur, for example, if the material is obscene under the law of
the receiving state or where the transfer across state lines of private
information violates the data protection laws of another state through
which the information passes. In either case, a contractual provision
could not alter the application of the local law.
This is especially true where the applicable policy applies to the
countries at either end of the deal. Arguably, a country whose contact
50 U.C.C. § 1-201 (defining conspicuous). In electronic transactions, this concept needs revi-
sion to reflect that the difference between large and small type may have no relevance to a
computer system working on bits and bytes of information. The proposed Article 2B on licens-
ing suggests a redefinition of the term to incorporate that, in a computer based contract, the
critical issue is whether or not the receiving computer can read the field and respond to it. See
Article 2B § 2B-102.
51 For a discussion of background choice of law principles dealing with copyright in interna-
tional venues. See NIMMER & NmAMER, supra note 4, § 17.11.
52 See, e.g., Model Electronic Data Interchange Trading Partner Agreement and Commentary,
45 Bus. LAW. 1717 (1990).
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with the transfer was solely in the role of hosting a computer systems
that served briefly as a conduit between receiving and sending systems
should not have an over-riding influence on the contract performance.
Its interest in the transaction and the data is at best very limited. In-
deed, this approach to the applicability of the law of conduit sites
could be a general principle of transactional law in the GII applicable
not only to contract, but also to intellectual property. It averts the
potentially stultifying impact of an electronic packet passing through
numerous countries whose laws will almost inevitably differ.
The second situation where choice of law rules have major impact
are those where no negotiated choice of law occurs. This will be very
common on the open Gil marketplace because many digital transac-
tions will involve consumer, rather than commercial, transactions. It
is as easy for an individual on the internet to acquire data from a ven-
dor in New York as it is to acquire it from a vendor in Chile. Yet, if I
am resident in Seattle, the one transaction appears to be purely do-
mestic, while the other is clearly international.
There are many ways to approach solution of the choice of law
issue. One option, suggested by both the U.N. Convention on the
Sale of Goods (Sales Convention) and the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts, is to view the applicable law as
international contract rules, rather than a particular state's law.5" The
UNII)ROIT rules, for example, purport to apply only to international
contracts. The rules distinguish between domestic and international
contracts:
The international character of a contract may be defined in a great vari-
ety of ways. The solutions adopted in both national and international
legislation range from a reference to the place of business or habitual
residence of the parties in different countries to the adoption of more
general criteria such as the contract having "significant connections with
more than one State," "involving a choice between the laws of different
States," or "affecting the interests of international trade." . . . The as-
sumption [here] is that the concept of "international" contracts should
be given the broadest possible interpretation so as ultimately to exclude
only those situations where no international element at all is
involved....
Such an approach cannot be used unless the potentially applica-
ble states (or parties) adopt a relevant convention or treaty taking into
53 My assumption here is that a state's law must be chosen. Some have suggested that the
internet establishes an independent regime vested in cyberspace that could be viewed as autono-
mous and self governing. See, eg., Henry Perritt, Dispute Resolution in Electronic Network
Communities, 38 VILL L. REv. 349 (1993).
54 UNIDROIT Principles 2.
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account the international nature of GII transactions. Such a conven-
tion exists with respect to the sale of goods. The Sales Convention
applies to "contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of
business are in different States [if] the States are [signatory] States; or
[the] rules of private international law lead to the application of the
law of a [signatory] State."55 Significantly for GII purposes, however,
the Sales Convention only applies to sales of goods. It expressly ex-
cludes transactions involving goods bought for personal, family or
household purposes unless the seller neither knew nor ought to have
known that this was the case. Many GII transactions will involve con-
sumers and many will involve digital information, rather than
purchases of goods. Perhaps an analogue to the Sales Convention, but
applicable to digital information licensing, is a better approach to this
problem.
Absent an international treaty or compact applying a general set
of rules, the issue is which state's law will govern. Generally, the pri-
mary choice is between the state where the information resides and is
sent from (sending state) or the state where the copies are received or
the access to the database initiated (receiving state). A focus on the
sending state's law would tend to stabilize and simplify the relevant
legal issues for the licensor/vendor. That choice was made in the EU
broadcast directive.56 In some cases, however, the malleability of the
information systems in the GII make the actual location of the data
immaterial. An alternative solution, suggested in draft UCC Article
2B focuses on the licensor's location (not that of the data). Section
2B-106(a) suggests:
(a) ... the rights and duties of the parties ... are determined by the law
of the State of the place where the licensor is located at the time that the
transfer of rights occurred or was to have occurred.
(c) A party to a contract is deemed located at its place of business if it
has one place of business, or at its chief executive office, if it has more
than one place of business, or its place of incorporation or other charter
authorization if it has no physical place of business. Otherwise, a party is
deemed located at its primary residence.57
As a matter of supporting commercial certainty, this approach best
enables the information vendor to design contracts around a single
state's law, rather than having the rules vary depending on where the
55 Sales Convention art. 1.
56 Council Directive 93/83/EEC of Sept. 27, 1993, OJEC L. 248/15, art. 1.2(b). See also ITSI
T.V. Productions, Inc. v. California Auth. of Racing Fairs, 785 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
57 Article 2B Proposal, supra note 26, § 2B-106.
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licensee resides or receives the information. It would also allow licen-
sees to discern what law governs without the difficult task of identify-
ing where the information asset happens to be placed.
There are other policies potentially at work in cases involving
consumers that may influence the applicable choice of law. For exam-
ple, in the United Kingdom, applicable law generally validates con-
tractual choices of law, but does not invariably do so. For consumer
contracts, the law hinges validation on whether the choice deprives
the consumer of protection that would be applicable in the country in
which the consumer resides.58 Absent a contractual choice of law, the
applicable law is the country in which the consumer is habitually a
resident.
Similarly, the Proposed Article 2B limits the effectiveness of
choice of law clauses in consumer transactions. Section 2B-107
provides:
(b) In a mass market license involving an individual [as licensee], the
choice of law in the parties' agreement is not enforceable if [it] chooses
the law of a jurisdiction other than the jurisdiction in which the individ-
ual resides when the agreement becomes enforceable; or section 2B-106
places the choice of law.
As this indicates, the manner of choosing what law to apply in a
digital information license on the GII entails a number of conflicting
policy themes and alternative approaches. Through the malleable na-
ture of its subject matter and speed of transmission, these issues are
intensified in the GH milieu and call out for development of a consen-
sus approach internationally or at least a sensible coordination.
Performance Obligations
A second area of potentially conflicting rules involves the ques-
tion of what performance obligations a GII license creates. Here,
again, a general, although not universal, rule exists that the parties
may expressly contract for whatever obligations they choose.59 Failing
that, what implied terms of obligation arise in a digital information
license executed on the internet or the GII? What obligations should
be present?
The answers are relatively determinable if the transaction in-
volves the acquisition or sale of goods. In U.S. law transactions, Arti-
cle 2 of the UCC provides an implied warranty that the goods, when
58 Contract Act of 1990 art. 5.2.
59 See UNIDROIT Principles art. 5.1.
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received, will be of merchantable quality.60 That standard basically re-
quires a product delivered with a quality that meets ordinary stan-
dards applicable to the contract description. It can be disclaimed,
although the disclaimer must be "conspicuous" and the meaning of
that phrase in a digital contract does not readily appear because the
concept is oriented to a term being noticeable to a human actor. In
international sales, unless excluded, the Sales Convention may apply.
The Sales Convention requires the seller to deliver goods that are free
of intellectual property claims of which it should have known and to
deliver goods that conform to the contract.61 Conformance to the
contract requires various elements of quality, including that they be fit
for the purposes for which goods of the same description would ordi-
narily be used, and fit for any particular purpose expressly or im-
pliedly made known to the seller.
Different law applies if the transaction entails a license, sale or
contract for digital information, images or data. Sales of goods law
does not apply, nor generally does any idea of there being implied
merchantability or other warranties. Instead, in the United States we
deal with common law contract governed by cases that entail consid-
eration of free speech and similar limits on what liability or obligation
should be imposed in an information contract.
In the U.S., UCC Articles 2 and 2A assume the vendor will de-
liver a product of acceptable quality. For services and information
contracts, however, most courts reject the position that a licensor or
other provider of discretionary services commits to produce an accu-
rate result in its contract unless it expressly undertakes to do so.62
Many courts hold that no warranty exists.63 The licensor commits only
that it possesses the skill that it represents itself to have and that it will
exercise that skill in a workmanlike and reasonably careful manner.6'
A workmanlike effort warranty does not create strict liability, but re-
sembles negligence theories. For example, the Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 299A provides: "one who undertakes to render services in
the practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill
60 U.C.C. § 2-314.
61 Sales Convention art. 35.
62 See Milau Assoc., Inc. v. North Avenue Devel. Corp., 42 N.Y.2d 482, 398 N.Y.S.2d 882,
368 N.E.2d 1247 (N.Y. 1977); Chemical Bank v. Title Services, Inc., 708 F.Supp. 245 (D. Minn.
1989).
63 See Rosos Litho Supply Corp. v. Hanson, 123 Ill. App.3d 290 (Ill. App. 1984).
64 See Diversified Graphics, Ltd. v. Groves, 868 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1988); Micro Managers,
Inc. v. Gregory, 147 Wis.2d 500, 434 N.W.2d 97 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988). Compare Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. v. FDP Corp., 811 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1991).
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and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or
trade ..... The reasonable care standard does not apply to a contract
for goods; it is supplanted by product quality warranties that create a
presumption of a warranty of result.65 Mirroring this standard in a
contract context, the court in Data Processing Services, Inc. v. LH
Smith Oil Corp.66 noted: "Those who hold themselves out to the world
as possessing skill and qualifications in their respective trades or pro-
fessions impliedly represent they possess the skill and will exhibit the
diligence ordinarily possessed by well informed members of the trade
or profession..."
Cases on information providers whose information proves to be
inaccurate involve both contract and tort theory. As a general rule,
however, transactions in information do not create liability without
fault. The pending Restatement of Torts: Products Liability makes this
point in commentary:
Although a tangible medium, itself clearly a product, delivers the infor-
mation, the plaintiff's grievance [is that] the information [is defective],
not the tangible object. Most courts, expressing concern that imposing
strict liability for the dissemination of false and defective information
would significantly impinge on free speech have, appropriately, refused
to impose strict liability in these cases.67 For liability, the information
provided must be inaccurate or incomplete, but the error must relate to
some culpable conduct by the licensor. Even with fault (negligence),
publishers may have no responsibility for any of the content of their
published material when that material is held out to the public for a
fee.
68
The Article 2B proposal makes an effort to codify these cases in
the following terms:
(a) If a licensor provides services, access, data, data processing, or the
like, the licensor warrants that there is no inaccuracy, flaw or other error
in the informational content caused by a failure of the licensor to exer-
cise reasonable care and workmanlike effort in its performance in col-
lecting, compiling, transcribing, or transmitting the information or data.
65 See Air Heaters, Inc. v. Johnson Electric, Inc., 23 UCC Rep.Serv. 39, 258 N.W.2d 649
(N.D. 1977); USM Corporation v. Arthur D. Little Sys. Inc., 28 Mass. App. 108,546 N.E.2d 888
(Mass. App. 1989).
66 Data Processing Serv's Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314, 319 (Ind. Ct. App.
1986).
67 RESTrATEMEmr OF TORT'S: PRODUCTs LsA~mr § 4, Comment d (Tentative Draft No. 2,
March 13, 1995).
68 See Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991) (publisher of book not
accountable for wrong information); Walter v. Bauer, 109 Misc 2d 189, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821 (SCt
1981). Compare Brockelsby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir 1985); Saloomey v. Jeppeson
& Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir 1983); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jeppeson & Co., 642 F.2d 339
(9th Cir. 1981).
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(b) The warranty under subsection (a) is not breached merely because
the services do not yield a result consistent with the objectives of the
transferee or because the information, data, or other content is not accu-
rate or is incomplete.
This approach to liability, grounded in U.S. rules and policies,
may not apply with equal force or persuasion in other countries. In
this respect, while one might argue that the UNIDROIT principles
will provide a potential international backdrop, how those principles
approach a digital information contract on the issue of performance
obligations is far from clear. They provide:
Where the quality of performance is neither fixed by, nor determinable
from, the contract a party is bound to render a performance of a quality
that is reasonable and not less than average in the circumstances.6 9
How this would apply to a digital information license is entirely un-
clear, but the better conclusion is that it would adopt a workmanlike,
non-negligent performance standard. Whether a free speech or simi-
lar over-lay further reduces the licensor's obligation depends on the
country whose law applies and whether preservation of free flow of
information represents a major theme in that country's law.
The issue has obvious relevance to digital information providers
on the GII and to those who make use of the digital information as-
sets. For the vendor, defining the level of care or performance re-
quired in the underlying transactions in the absence of a specific
contract term affects pricing and risk calculations. Wide variations in
exposure or unknown risks amplify the difficulty of employing GII as
a marketplace. For the licensee of information, the issue involves a
question of reliability. While massive amounts of digital information
suddenly made available on the GII represent a potentially valuable
resource, data provided without assurances of reliability at even a
minimal level lacks the element that would otherwise give it value. A
proper, international balance of standards here would be an important
contribution to the evolution of the GII as an information resource.
PART 4
CONCLUSION
The simple premise revealed in this discussion is that the multina-
tional character of GII-related property and contract law creates po-
tentially huge problems for the development of commercial
relationships relating to information and other intangible property
moved through and around the GII. More so here than in any prior
69 UNIDROIT Principles art. 5.6.
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commercial/economic context, an enhanced degree of harmonization
and simplification is needed to enable the transactions made possible
by the technology to occur.
If a contract law regime applicable to Gil were to be developed,
its fundamental premise must reflect the diversity of subject matter
and the variety of social background involved in this global system.
The correct premise relies on the freedom of commercial parties to
adjust their contractual relationship to fit their own purposes.70 Be-
yond that, a second commercial law premise defines the goal of uni-
form law or harmonization efforts as being to facilitate commercial
practice. Grant Gilmore expressed this in the following terms:
The principal objects... [are] to be accurate and not to be original.
[The] intention is to assure that if a given transaction ... is initiated, it
shall have a specified result; they attempt to state as a matter of law the
conclusion which the business community apart from statute... gives to
the transaction in any case. But achievement of those modest goals is a
task of considerable difficulty.71
This rings appropriate and true in the context of Gil license con-
tracting. In the upcoming era, true international trade in digital infor-
mation products can occur with resources already available and being
deployed. In that era, a stabilization of contract (as well as intellec-
tual property) law would provide immense advantages to the commer-
cialization of cyberspace.
70 U.C.C. § 2A-101, Comment.
71 Grant Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L. J. 1341
(1957).
